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In 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit became
the first circuit court to hold that a debtor can "strip off' a wholly valueless lien
in a "Chapter 20" bankruptcy in Branigan v. Davis (In re Davis).I Addressing
an issue that has divided bankruptcy courts, district courts, and bankruptcy
appellate panels across the country, the Fourth Circuit armed debtors in this
circuit with a powerful (and controversial) tool to restructure (or avoid) debteven if the debtor is ineligible for a bankruptcy discharge! 3 With millions of
homeowners still "underwater," and the housing market's future still precarious,4
lawyers, creditors, and debtors in the Fourth Circuit-and the entire country
generally need to be well versed in the Davis decision. Moreover, this decision
yet again brings into the crosshairs the Supreme Court's infamous interpretation
of "allowed secured claim" from Dewsnup v. Timm. 5 Not only will the issue in
Davis likely reach the Supreme Court, but it also may allow the Supreme Court
to take a mulligan on its much-maligned analysis in Dewsnup.

Assistant Professor of Law, Liberty University School of Law.
1. 716 F.3d 331, 332 (4th Cir. 2013).
2.
See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
3.
See In re Davis, 716 F.3d at 338.
4.
See Legislative Highlights, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Apr. 2012, 10, 122 23 (noting that
"millions of homeowners remain underwater" and "the housing market remains volatile").

5.

502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992).

963

Published by Scholar Commons, 2014

1

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 16
964
II.

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 65: 963

BACKGROUND

Bankruptcy offers the "honest, but unfortunate debtor" 6 a myriad of tools to
achieve the coveted "fresh start." These tools include the protection of the
automatic stay, the discharge of personal liability on debts,9 and possibly even
the ability to restructure debts.10 Individuals declaring bankruptcy basically have
two options. First, in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy sometimes called a "straight
bankruptcy" the debtor's nonexempt assets are marshaled and then liquidated;
afterwards, the debtor enjoys the fresh start of the discharge.
Second, in a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the debtor generally gets to keep assets, but has to forgo
a portion of future earnings over a period of time; after successfully completing
these payments for a period of years-generally either three or five years the
debtor gets to enjoy a fresh start. 12 A powerful tool in the Chapter 13 arsenal has
caused division in bankruptcy courts across the country the ability for the
debtor to "strip off," or remove, an "unsecured" junior lien attached to real
property, normally a residence. 13
A.

Basic Principles ofLien Stripping

Lien stripping is the practice whereby a debtor uses the bankruptcy process
to "avoid" (i.e., remove), either in whole or in part, a lien on the debtor's
property.14 If the debtor is successful in stripping the lien, the debtor can then
enjoy that property free and clear of the creditor's security interest in the
property. The two types of lien stripping are (1) "strip downs" and (2) "strip
offs."l6 Strip down refers to a situation in which the debtor avoids only some,

6.
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (citing Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.
Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)).
7.
See id. (quoting Williams, 236 U.S. at 554-55).
8.
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2012) (providing that a petition in Chapter 11 bankruptcy
operates as an automatic stay for enforcement of debts, judgments, and other proceedings against
the debtor).
9.
See, e.g., id. § 727(b) (providing that if the debtor is discharged under this section, that
order operates to discharge the debtor from all debts that arose before the bankruptcy order).
10. See, e.g., id. § 1322(b)(2) (stating that the debtor's filed plan for bankruptcy may "modify
the rights of holders of secured claims").
11. See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 700.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
16th ed. 2013).
12. See 8 id. 1322.02, p. 1322-8; 8 id. 1322.18, p. 1322-60.
13. See, e.g., In re Davis, 716 F.3d at 336 (noting the split in authority).
14. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 11, at 506.06, p. 506-132 (citing Talbert v.
City Mortg. Servs. (In re Talbert), 344 F.3d 555, 556 n.1 (6th Cir. 2003); Ryan v. Homecomings
Fin. Network, 253 F.3d 778, 781 n.3 (4th Cir. 2001)).
15. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012).
16. 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 11, at
506.06[1][b], p. 506-136; see also
Johnson v. Asset Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 226 BR. 364, 365 n.3 (D. Md. 1998) (explaining the difference
between strippingoffand strippingdown a lien in the bankruptcy context).
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but not all, of a particular lien.1 Strip off refers to the ability to remove a lien
entirely from the property.18 The ability to strip a lien arises by the interplay of
several sections of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Bankruptcy Code segregates claimsl into several categories.
The
classification of a claim determines its treatment in the bankruptcy process. 21 Of
the possible classification of claims, relevant here are the classifications of
secured versus unsecured. Holders of secured claims are always preferred over
unsecured claims.22 The benefit of being a secured creditor is that the claim
must be paid in full 23 up to the value of the collateral securing the claim. 24 An
unsecured creditor, however, has no such protection.
Section 506(a)25 provides that a creditor's claim is secured "to the extent of
the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property." 26
27
The remaining balance of the creditor's claim is unsecured.
In bankruptcy
parlance, this is known as bifurcating the creditor's claim.28 For example, if a
creditor has a claim against the debtor for $125, and the collateral securing such
debt is worth only $100, the creditor has a secured claim for $100 and an
unsecured claim for $25.
Section 506(d) provides that "[t]o the extent that a lien secures a claim
against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void." 29
Based on a plain reading of § 506(d), it would appear in the example above that
the debtor could avoid $25 of the lien because that portion is unsecured and,
therefore, cannot be a secured claim. Due to the Supreme Court's decision in
Dewsnup, however, the operation of § 506(d) depends greatly on whether the
debtor files a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.30

17. See Ryan, 253 F.3d at 781 n.3; Johnson, 226 B.R. at 365 n.3.
18. See Ryan, 253 F.3d at 781 n.3; Johnson, 226 B.R. at 365 n.3.
19. The Bankruptcy Code deals with claims, not debts per se. While debts are claims, the
term claim is more encompassing. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(5), (12) (2012).
20. For example, claims can be classified as, inter alia, "secured," id. § 506(a), "unsecured,"
id., "priority," id. § 507(a), and "super priority," see id. § 503(b).
21. For example, a priority claim needs to be paid first in a liquidation bankruptcy (Chapter
7), see id. § 726(a)(1), and must be paid in full in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, see id. § 1322(a)(2).
22. See, e.g., 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 11, at 506.02, p. 506-8 (setting forth
a number of the special protections afforded to holders of secured claims).
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2).
24. See id. § 506(a).
25. All section references are to Title 11 of the United States Code unless otherwise
indicated.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
27. Id.
28. See David Gray Carlson, Bifurcation of Undersecured Claims in Bankruptcy, 70 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1996).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). In § 506(d), the two exceptions to this rule are (1) if the claim was
disallowed under § 502(b)(5) or § 502(e), or (2) if the failure to be a secured claim is due to the
entity not filing a claim in accordance with § 501. Id.
30. See Woolsey v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Woolsey), 696 F.3d 1266, 1276 (10th Cir. 2012).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2014

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 16

966

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 65: 963

B. Lien Stripping in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
Despite the clear language in § 506(d)-language that plainly allows a
debtor to avoid the unsecured portion of a lien the Supreme Court held that
such liens could not be stripped down in Chapter 7 bankruptcies. 3' In Dewsnup,
the debtors owned a piece of real property judicially valued at $39,000,32 and the
outstanding debt on that real property was $120,000.33 The debtors moved to
avoid, under § 506(d), the $81,000 portion in excess of the land's value and then
redeem 34 the land by paying the secured creditor $39,000, instead of paying the
debt in full. 35
Whether the debtors' plan would work hinged upon how the Court
interpreted the phrase allowed secured claim in § 506(d).36
The Court
interpreted allowed secured claim in § 506(d) not as one indivisible term, but
rather "term-by-term to refer to any claim that is, first, allowed, and second,
secured." 37 Therefore, because the claim at issue in Dewsnup was allowed
pursuant to § 50238 and secured by a lien, it did not come within the scope of
§ 506(d).3 9 Bolstering its statutory construction gymnastics,40 the Court relied

31. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419-20 (1992).
32. Id. at 413. The valuation of collateral is a critical aspect of any bankruptcy. The
bankruptcy court must determine the secured creditor's interest in the property, the relevant fair
market value of the property, and any bankruptcy market adjustments specific to the bankruptcy
process. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 11, at
506.03[4][b] (quoting Assocs.
Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 961-65 (1997)) (citing Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 327, 119 Stat. 23, 99-100).
33. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 413.
34. Section 722 allows Chapter 7 debtors to "redeem" personal property. See 6 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 11, at 722.01 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)). This means that the debtor
can keep a particular piece of tangible personal property by paying the secured creditor the amount
of the allowed secured claim. Id. This can often be advantageous to the debtor because it allows
the individual to retain tangible personal property and avoid a potentially higher replacement costin the event the secured creditor takes the collateral. See id.
35. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 413.
36. See id. at 414-16.
37. See id. at 415 (explaining the respondents' argument for a specific interpretation of
allowed secured claim that the Court ultimately adopted).
38. Allowance is the process that entitles the holder of a claim to participate in the
bankruptcy. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 11, at 502.01. Therefore, the holder of
an allowed claim is entitled to distributions of the estate or to vote on Chapter 11 plans. Id.
Generally, a claim becomes allowed in one of three ways: "[F]irst, a proof of claim is filed or
deemed filed and no party objects; second, a claim is allowed by the court after an objection is filed;
and third, a claim is estimated by the court under the provisions of section 502(c)." Id. Sections
502(b), (d), and (e) regard the disallowance of claims. Id.
39. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417.
40. Dewsnup has been severely attacked in academic literature. See, e.g., Barry E. Adler,
Creditor Rights After Johnson and Dewsnup, 10 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 11 (1993) ("Apparently, the
Court was willing to mind the White Queen, who, while admonishing Alice to believe the
impossible, boasted that she sometimes believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast."
(citing LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING

GLASS 176 (Signet 1960))); Carlson, supra note 28, at 14 ("Justice Blackmun's opinion will never
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upon pre-Code bankruptcy law that allowed for liens on real property to "ride
through" bankruptcy unaffected. 41 Therefore, in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, "the
creditor's lien stays with the real property until foreclosure." 42
The policy enunciated in Dewsnup is clear: any post valuation date
appreciation in the collateral's value should inure to creditors, not the debtor;
otherwise, allowing such lien avoidance would grant the debtor a windfall at the
creditor's expense. 43 After Dewsnup, therefore, courts have refused to permit
44
lien stripping in Chapter 7 bankruptcies.
Although the lien in Dewsnup was a
consensual lien, later cases have expanded Dewsnup's application to
nonconsensual liens as well.45 Going back to the earlier example of a lien with a
balance of $125 but collateral worth only $100, a Chapter 7 debtor-despite the
plain language in § 506(d) would not be able to strip the $25 unsecured portion
of the lien under Dewsnup.

be offered up as an exemplar of clarity. Indeed, the opinion struggles simply to articulate the
arguments of the various parties, culminating in little more than a declaration of the result." (citing
Taras v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp. (In re Taras), 136 B.R. 941, 949 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992)));
Margaret Howard, Dewsnupping the Bankruptcy Code," 1 J. BANKR. L & PRAC. 513, 513 (1992)
("Although the outcome of the case is questionable, the reasoning used by the Court in reaching its
decision is of even more concern. This reasoning may carry such pernicious consequences in areas
other than strip down that the Court needs to be reminded of the physicians' motto: First, do no
harm." (internal citations omitted)); Margaret Howard, Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: An Essay on
Missing the Point, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 313, 318 (1994) ("Any assurance that the Supreme Court
understood this fundamental bankruptcy principle was shattered by Dewsnup v. Timm." (citing
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 410)).
41. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 418 (citing Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991);
Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 297 (1991)).
42. Id. at 417. Moreover, this is bolstered by the legislative history:
Subsection (d) permits liens to pass through the bankruptcy case unaffected.
However, if a party in interest requests the court to determine and allow or disallow the
claim secured by the lien under section 502 and the claim is not allowed, then the lien is
void to the extent that the claim is not allowed. The voiding provision does not apply to
claims disallowed only under section 502(e), which requires disallowance of certain
claims against the debtor by a codebtor, surety, or guarantor for contribution or
reimbursement.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 357 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6313; see also
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 419.
43. Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417.
44. See, e.g., Enewally v. Wash. Mut. Bank (In re Enewally), 368 F.3d 1165, 1169 (9th Cir.
2004) (explaining that debtors cannot strip liens in Chapter 7 cases, but the extent to which that
prohibition exists under other Chapters remains an open question); Talbert v. City Mortg. Servs. (In
re Talbert), 344 F.3d 555, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that Dewsnup made clear the principle
that the Chapter 7 debtor could not use § 506(a) and (d) to "strip off' a junior lien); Hamlett v.
Amsouth Bank (In re Hamlett), 322 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at
417) (explaining that Dewsnup embraces the principle that a lien in Chapter 7 passes through
bankruptcy unaffected).
45. See, e.g., Crossroads of Hillsville v. Payne, 179 B.R. 486, 490 91 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1995) (refusing to strip a nonconsensual judgment lien); Warner v. United States (In re Warner),
146 B.R. 253, 255 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1992) (refusing to strip a federal tax lien).
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C. Lien Stripping in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy
Although a lien cannot be stripped in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, that is not the
case in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.t In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, when the debtor
proposes a plan to pay back debts over time, that plan may according to
§ 1322(b)(2)-"modify the rights of holders of secured claims ... or of holders
of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of any class of
claims." 47 Courts have, therefore, interpreted § 1322(b)(2) to allow debtors to
strip off valueless liens as unsecured claims. 48
While the ability to strip liens generally in Chapter 13 is established, the
Code has protections built in to prevent lien stripping in certain circumstances.
The primary protection is in § 1322(b)(2), which provides that a plan may not
modify the rights of "a security interest in real property that is the debtor's
principal residence." 49 Consequently, substantial litigation ensued regarding the
scope of this protection. Specifically, the litigation centered around whether
§ 506(a) operates to bifurcate the residential mortgagee's claim into secured and
unsecured portions, with § 1322(b)(2)'s antimodification clause protecting only
the former.
As in Dewsnu , the issue was how the bifurcation of § 506(a)
affected other Code sections.
In Nobelman v. American Savings Bank,52 the

46. See, e.g., Zimmer v. PSB Lending Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that the rights of a creditor holding only an unsecured claim may be stripped down
in Chapter 13); Lane v. W. Interstate Bancorp (In re Lane), 280 F.3d 663, 668 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding that Chapter 13 antimodification provision does not extend to the rights of holders of
unsecured claims); Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty (In re Pond), 252 F.3d 122, 125-26 (2d Cir.
2001) (adopting the majority view that Chapter 13's antimodification exception is triggered only
when the collateral has enough value to cover the creditor's claim); Tanner v. FirstPlus Fin., Inc. (In
re Tanner), 217 F.3d 1357, 1359-60 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that any completely unsecured claim
is not protected from modification in a Chapter 13 case); Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass'n
(In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 291 (5th Cir. 2000) (agreeing with the majority of courts that the
holder of an unsecured claim cannot invoke the antimodification provisions of Chapter 13);
McDonald v. Master Fin., Inc. (In re McDonald), 205 F.3d 606, 609 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that "a
wholly unsecured mortgage is not subject to the antimodification clause" in Chapter 13).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2012).
48. See, e.g., In re Davis, 716 F.3d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2013) (explaining that § 506(a)
operates with § 1322(b)(2) to allow "a bankruptcy court, in a Chapter 13 case, to strip off a lien
against a primary residence with no value").
49. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
50. Four courts of appeals ruled that the antimodification rule protected only the secured
portion. See Bellamy v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir.
1992), abrogated by Nobleman v. Am. Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993); Eastland Mortg. Co. v.
Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410, 1415 (10th Cir. 1991), overruled by Independence One Mortg.
Corp. v. Wicks (In re Wicks), 5 F.3d 1372 (10th Cir. 1993); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortg.
Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 128 (3d Cir. 1990), abrogated by Nobleman, 508 U.S. 324; Hougland v.
Lomas & Nettleman Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th Cir. 1989), abrogated by
Nobleman, 508 U.S. 324.
51. See, e.g., In re Houghland, 886 F.2d at 1183 (explaining that the resolution of the case
depends on "the interplay between . . 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) and 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)").
52. 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
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Supreme Court held that the entire lien-including the unsecured portion was
protected and not subject to modification.5 3
Another protection offered to secured lien holders is found in § 1325(a)(5).54
This section, which contains the required elements of a confirmable plan,
provides that, if a secured party does not approve the plan, the plan must provide
that the secured claim holder will retain liens until the earlier of either payment
of the debt or a discharge. 5 This clause, in particular, was at the forefront of the

issue in In re Davis.56
What if, though, the lien is completely undersecured (e.g., a junior lien that
had no equity associated with it)? The rationale in Nobelman was that, even
though a portion of the loan was unsecured, the creditor was, nevertheless, the
holder of a secured claim.5 Using that rationale, courts have held, in contrast,
that completely undersecured claims are modifiable under § 1322(b)(2) because
they are not even secured in part.
Seemingly, then, the rules concerning lien stripping a peared quite settled.
In Chapter 7, no lien stripping is allowed per Dewsnup. In Chapter 13, lien
stripping is allowed per Nobelman, so long as the lien does not secure, at least in
part, a claim against the debtor's principal residence.60 Is lien stripping available
in a Chapter 13 case, however, when a debtor is not entitled to a discharge due to
a recent Chapter 7 discharge? That was the issue squarely presented in Davis.
D.

"Chapter20" Bankruptcy

A "Chapter 20" bankruptcy is the colloquialism for a debtor who files
Chapter 13 bankruptcy after already receiving a discharge in an earlier Chapter 7
bankruptcy.61 Importantly, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) added § 1328(f)(1), which provides that a

53. Id. at 332; see also 8 COLLIERON BANKRUPTCY, supranote 11, at
1322-25 (citations omitted).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).
55. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(A)-(B).

1322.06[1][a][i], pp.

56. 716 F.3d 331, 333, 336 37 (4th Cir. 2013).
57. Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 329 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 239 &

n.3 (1989)).
58. See, e.g., In re Davis, 716 F.3d at 335-37 (explaining that courts have permitted debtors
in Chapter 13 cases to strip off completely valueless liens); Zimmer v. PSB Lending Corp. (In re
Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the rights of a creditor holding only an
unsecured claim may be stripped down in Chapter 13); Lane v. W. Interstate Bancorp (In re Lane),
280 F.3d 663, 665 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that "modification of the rights of a totally unsecured
homestead mortgagee is permitted by § 1322(b)(2)"); Pond v. Farm Specialist Realty (In re Pond),
252 F.3d 122, 127 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2)) (ruling that because a lien was
wholly unsecured, the lien was not protected under the antimodification exception in Chapter 13
cases).
59. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992).
60. Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 331, 332.
61. InreDavis,716F.3dat332n.1.
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debtor may not receive a Chapter 13 discharge within four years of a Chapter 7
petition that ultimately resulted in a discharge. 62 Therefore, the rub in a Chapter
20 bankruptcy is that, due to the earlier Chapter 7 discharge, a new discharge is
not available in the Chapter 13 proceeding. Despite not being able to receive a
new discharge, the later Chapter 13 bankruptcy can still be appealing to debtors
due to the automatic stay,64 the ability to cure arrearages,65 the ability to adjust
interest rates under plan payments,66 and the other panoply of tools a debtor has
in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy generally.67 Chapter 20 bankruptcy filings are
permitted because "Congress did not intend categorically to foreclose the benefit
of Chapter 13 reorganization to a debtor who previously has filed for Chapter 7
relief."68 With respect to lien stripping, though, the issue is whether the debtor
may use the Chapter 13 proceeding to strip off a wholly unsecured junior
mortgage that survived the earlier Chapter 7 proceeding, even though a new
discharge is not available.69 According to some, allowing this would allow an
end run around Dewsnup's prohibition against Chapter 7 lien stripping: the
debtor would get the Chapter 7 discharge and then a Chapter 13 lien strip.70
III. INREDAVIS
In June of 2008, Bryan Davis and Carla Bracey-Davis filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland.
Their financial situation was precarious: the Davises ran large monthly deficits
72
and Mrs. Bracey-Davis was unemployed.
In their Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the
Davises wanted to discharge their unsecured debt and strip down liens on their
primary residence.
Although they were advised that lien stripping is not
available in Chapter 7, they nevertheless continued the bankruptcy proceeding.

62.

Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,

§ 312, 119 Stat. 23, 86-87 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(1) (2012)).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f)(1) ("[T]he court shall not grant a discharge of all debts provided for
in the plan or disallowed under section 502, if the debtor has received a discharge . . . in a case filed
under Chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title during the 4-year period preceding the date of the order for
relief under this chapter.").
64. See id. § 362(a).

65. Id. § 1322(b)(5).
66. See id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).
67. See generally id. § 1322(b) (providing all of the options a debtor has when constructing a
plan in a Chapter 13 case, including the ability to add "any other appropriate provision not
inconsistent with this title").
68. Branigan v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 515 F.3d 272, 281-82 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 87 (1991)).
69. See In re Davis, 716 F.3d 331, 334 (4th Cir. 2013).
70. Id. at 337.
71. Id. at 333.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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In September of 2008, the Davises received their Chapter 7 discharge, but their
mortgage debt was unchanged.
After their 2008 bankruptcy, and despite obtaining employment, the Davises
still had no savings and had mounting mortgage arrearages.
In September of
2009, the Davises filed a Chapter 13 petition with the desire to reorganize their
debts, pay the mortgage arrearages, pay consumer debt, and strip off junior
liens. At that time, their home had a value of $270,000, but "was encumbered
by a first-priority lien with a balance of $275,373.59, a second-priority lien with
a balance of $115,138.58, and a third-priority lien with a balance of
The Davises eventually moved to strip off both junior liens.79
$117,603.3 1."
A.

Bankruptcy Court Decision

The Davises first moved under § 506 to avoid the wholly unsecured thirdpriority junior lien held by TD Bank.so TD Bank objected to that motion and,
along with the trustee, objected to the proposed Chapter 13 plan, arguing that
§ 1325 requires the entry of a discharge to strip a lien.8 1 Both TD Bank and the
trustee argued for a per se rule that prohibits lien stripping in a Chapter 20
bankruptcy unless the debtor receives a discharge.82
Despite authority supporting TD Bank's position, 83 Judge Lipp declined to
adopt a per se rule. Rather, the court adopted the position that the Bankruptcy
Code does not condition the ability to strip off a wholly unsecured lien on the

75. Id. at 334.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Davis v. TD Bank (In re Davis), 447 B.R. 738, 741 (Bankr. D. Md. 2011).
81. See id. at 741-42, 743.
82. Id. at 741-42.
83. See, e.g., Bank of the Prairie v. Picht (In re Picht), 428 B.R. 885, 890 (B.A.P. 10th Cir.
2010) ("We note that because the [debtor is] not entitled to a discharge ... § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I),
which requires a plan to provide that a secured creditor retain its lien until discharge under § 1328,
is inapplicable."); In re Fenn, 428 B.R. 494, 500 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010) ("The court agrees that the
junior lien can be valued at zero for plan confirmation purposes, however, the lien cannot be held to
be unenforceable and void until the plan ends and the Debtors receive a section 1328 discharge.");
In re Mendoza, No. 09-22395-HRT, 2010 WL 736834, at *5 (Bankr. D. Colo. Jan. 21, 2010)
(holding that because a discharge had not occurred per § 1328(f), "the Debtors [could not] avoid the
second mortgage lien . .. pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(d)"); Blosser v. KLC Fin., Inc. (In re
Blosser), Bankr. No. 07-28223-svk, Adv. No. 08-2353, 2009 WL 1064455, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Wis.
Apr. 15, 2009) ("Since avoidance of the lien is contingent upon a Chapter 13 discharge, and the
Debtor does not qualify for a Chapter 13 discharge, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted .... ); In re Jarvis, 390 B.R. 600, 605-06 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008) ("A nodischarge Chapter 13 case may not, however, result in a permanent modification of a creditor's
rights where such modification has traditionally only been achieved through discharge .....
84. In re Davis, 447 B.R. at 745.
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debtor's eligibility for discharge.
The court first noted that receiving a
discharge is not always the desired goal in a Chapter 13 proceeding. 86 For
example, in Branigan v. Bateman (In re Bateman), the Fourth Circuit stated
that "it is the ability to reorganize one's financial life and pay off debts, not the
ability to receive a discharge, that is the debtor's 'holy grail' in many Chapter
13 cases.88 Consequently, Chapter 13 debtors who are ineligible for discharge
may still "enjoy[ ] all of the rights of a [C]hapter 13 debtor, including the right to
strip off liens." 89
In response, TD Bank pointed to In re Jarvis,90 in which a bankruptcy court
held that when a Chapter 13 debtor is ineligible for discharge, the plan cannot
strip off a wholly unsecured junior mortgage lien. 91 According to the Jarvis
court:
A no-discharge Chapter 13 case may not, however, result in a permanent
modification of a creditor's rights where such modification has
traditionally only been achieved through a discharge and where such
modification is not binding if a case is dismissed or converted. This
Court can find no evidence that, by adding new § 1328(f), Congress
intended to expand debtors' remedies in the way that the Debtor here
92
proposes.
Rebuffing Jarvis, the bankruptcy judge held that, although the Jarvis court
recognized that a wholly unsecured claim is not a secured claim at all under
§ 1325, the court failed to appreciate the consequences of that determinationnamely that modification of the claim is no longer protected under
§ 1325(a)(5)(B).93
TD Bank also argued that allowing the debtors to benefit from a Chapter 7
discharge and then immediately file a Chapter 13-ostensibly to strip liens
only would be an end run around Dewsnup's lien stripping prohibition.4 The
bankruptcy court disagreed, noting that if the sole purpose in filing the Chapter
13 was to strip the lien, the debtors would still have to overcome allegations of
bad faith at the plan confirmation stage. 95

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 745-46.
Id. at 746.
515 F.3d 272 (4th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 283.
In re Tran, 431 B.R. 230, 237 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010).
390 B.R. 600 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008).
In re Davis, 447 B.R. at 746 (citing In re Jarvis, 390 B.R. at 605-06).
Id. at 746-47 (quoting In re Jarvis, 390 B.R. at 605-06).
Id. at 747.
See id.
Id. (citing In re Tran, 431 B.R. 230, 237-38 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010)).
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The bankruptcy court also declined to follow In re Fenn.96 In Fenn, the
bankruptcy court focused its analysis on whether the underlying claim had been
disallowed.97 The Fenn court acknowledged that a junior lien could be valued at
zero for confirmation purposes, but that the lien could not be avoided until
completion of the plan and entry of a discharge order. 98 Focusing on § 506(d),
the Fenn court held that the claim, although valueless, was still "allowed," i.e.,
neither rejected nor formally disallowed by the court. 99 Moreover, although
§ 506(a) "allows the bifurcation of the rights of holders of secured
claims, ... [i]t does not change the rights immediately allowing the permanent
modification of a secured claim to unsecured status, as strip off or avoidance
occurs at discharge."100 According to the Fenn court, §§ 1322(b)(2), 1325(a)(5),
and 506(d) can be reconciled by construing § 506(d) to avoid liens when the
Rejecting Fenn, Judge Lipp noted that an
claim has been disallowed.10o
unsecured lien holder cannot establish the reoquired allowed secured claim
needed to invoke any protection of § 1325(a)(5). 10
Implicitly recognizing that Chapter 20 lien stripping could be abused, the
court highlighted that other sections of the Code offer creditor protection.103 For
example, § 349(b)(1)(C) provides that if the debtor's case is dismissed or the
plan is not completed, the lien will "spring back."l04
In addition to holding that the impossibility of a Chapter 13 discharge does
not bar the avoidance of a valueless lien, the bankruptcy court explained that it
must still find that the plan was proposed in good faith. o0 This analysis is based
on the totality of the circumstances on a case-by-case basis. 106 In Deans v.
O'Donnell,107 the Fourth Circuit suggested a nonexhaustive list of factors,
including, inter alia, the percentage of proposed repayment, the debtor's
financial situation, plan payment period, employment history and prospects, and
past bankruptcy filings.
With regard to Chapter 20 cases, the Davis court noted that the courts should
also consider:
(1) The proximity in time of the Chapter 13 filing to the Chapter 7
filing.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 748 (citing In re Fenn, 428 B.R. 494 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010)).
In re Fenn, 428 BR. at 498; see also In re Davis, 447 BR. at 748.
In re Fenn, 428 BR. at 500.
See id.
Id. at 501.
Id.
In re Davis, 447 BR. at 748.
Id. (citing In re Tran, 431 BR. 230, 236-37 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010)).
Id. at 748-49.
Id. at 749 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (2012)).
Id. (citing Deans v. O'Donnell (In re Deans), 692 F.2d 968, 972 (4th Cir. 1982)).
692 F.2d 968.
In re Davis, 447 BR. at 749 (citing In re Deans, 692 F.2d at 972).
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(2) Whether the debtor has incurred some change in circumstances
between the filings that suggests a second filing was appropriate and
that the debtor will be able to comply with the terms of the Chapter 13
plan.
(3) Whether the two filings accomplish a result that is not permitted in
either Chapter standing alone.
(4) Whether the two filings treat creditors in a fundamentally fair and
equitable manner or whether they are rather an attempt to manipulate the
bankruptcy system or are an abuse of the purpose and spirit of the
Bankruptcy Code. 109
The bankruptcy court found that the totality of the factors weighed in favor
of good faith.
Looking in particular at the Chapter 20 factors, the court
concluded that the fifteen-month period between bankruptcies did not indicate a
lack of good faith because, inter alia, the debtors found new employment and
incurred new debt, which justified a second filing. 11 The court also did not find
any evidence of the debtors trying to manipulate or otherwise abuse the
bankruptcy process.112
B. Fourth Circuit Resolutionll3
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit framed the issue as "whether BAPCPA
precludes the stripping off of valueless liens by Chapter 20 debtors ineligible for
a discharge."11 4 Before addressing that issue, though, the court first considered
whether a bankruptcy court can strip off a valueless lien generally in Chapter 13
proceedings.115 Following the circuit courts that had considered the issue, 116 the
court agreed that such valueless liens could be stripped generally.11 The court
based this conclusion on the operation of § 506(a), which bifurcates claims into

109. Id. at 750 (citingIn re Cushman, 217 B.R. 470, 477 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 751.
112. Id.
113. The district court consolidated In re Davis with Branigan v. Moore (In re Moore), No.
08:11-cv-01718 (D. Md. 2011), and summarily affirmed the bankruptcy court in both cases. See
TD Bank, N.A. v. Davis, Civil Nos. PJM 11-1270, PJM 11-1718, PMJ 11-1940, 2012 WL 439701
(D. Md. Jan. 12, 2012). The Chapter 13 trustee appealed. In re Davis, 716 F.3d 331, 332 (4th Cir.
2013).
114. In re Davis, 716 F.3d at 334. While the appeal was a consolidated appeal, In re Davis
was the focus. See id. at 333, 334 n.3.
115. Id. at 334-35.
116. See id. at 335.
117. Id. at 336. The Fourth Circuit had held the same in prior unpublished (non-precedential)
opinions. Id. at 335.
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secured and unsecured claims, as well as § 1322, which permits the modification
of the rights of unsecured creditors.118
Addressing the ultimate issue, the court first noted that, even after BAPCPA
was enacted, "a debtor may still take advantage of the protections offered by
Chapter 13 short of a discharge."ll 9 As the court noted, debtors have several
reasons-other than receiving a discharge-to file a Chapter 13, for example, "to
cure a mortgage, deal with other secured debts, or simply pay debts under a plan
with the protection of the automatic stay."l20 Therefore, according to the court,
"if the Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism for stripping off worthless liens
absent a discharge, a debtor may avail himself of that relief."
The court
ultimately areed with the debtors that the Code does provide such a
mechanism.
The court noted that § 506(a) operated to classify the junior liens at issue as
unsecured claims. 123 Moreover, "[S]ection 506 has always operated in tandem
with [S]ection 1322(b) to strip liens in Chapter 13 cases."
Therefore, because
the BAPCPA did not amend §§ 506 or 1322(b), "the analysis permitting lienstripping in Chapter 20 cases is no different than that in any other Chapter 13
cases."l25 The Fourth Circuit rejected other courts that relied on § 1325(a)(5)
because that provision applies only to allowed secured claims.126 Relying on the
Supreme Court's decision in Nobelman, the court noted that any claim must be
valued under § 506 before any application of § 1322 is determined and in this
case, those liens were unsecured and, thus, valueless.127
The court made sure to focus on the trustee's Dewsnup end run argument.128
The court noted that, even after BAPCPA, Congress left intact the general ability
in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy to strip liens even in a situation in which a debtor
could satisfy the requirements for filing a Chapter 20 bankruptcy.129 Like the
bankruptcy court, the Fourth Circuit highlighted the other anti-abuse provisions
in the Code that protect debtors in a Chapter 13 or Chapter 20 lien stripping
scenario: (1) good faith filing requirements, (2) good faith plan requirements,
30
and (3) § 349(b)(1)(C)'s spring back.1

118. See id.; see also supra Parts ILA, II.C (explaining the operation of § 506 and § 1322).
119. In re Davis, 716 F.3d at 336.
120. Id. (quoting Branigan v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 515 F.3d 272, 283 (4th Cir. 2008))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Id. at 338.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. Id.

130. Id.
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In addition, the court held that the availability of a discharge is not
dispositive.131 The court explained that discharge affects only in personam
rights the ability to seek recourse against the debtor personally. 2 Lien
stripping, on the other hand, affects the in rem liability against the collateral. 133
The court ultimately determined that it is not fatal that, at the completion of the
plan, such orders modifying those in rem rights become permanent.134
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision.135
C. The Dissent
Judge Keenan dissented, arguing that the majority's holding resulted in a
situation in which "a creditor whose rights are secured by real property with no
present value . . . is treated less favorably than a wholly unsecured creditor."1 36
In support of her position, she pointed to § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i), which provides that
the holder of an allowed secured claim must retain its lien until discharge or full
payment of the debt.137 In rebuffing the majority's opinion that § 1325 does
not apply because the valuation rule in § 506 renders such valueless claims as
unsecured Judge Keenan posited that the operation of § 1325 does not hinge on
the valuation process in § 506.138 She stated that § 506(a) does not control the
meaning of allowed secured claim in § 506(d).139 Therefore, in a manner similar
to the Dewsnup Court's analysis, she argued that the allowed secured claim
meaning in § 1325 is simply (1) a claim, (2) that is allowed (i.e., not objected to),
and (3) secured. 140
In this case, according to Judge Keenan, TD Bank did have a claim that,
although valueless, was allowed and secured by the house.141 Judge Keenan
asserted that because the Davises did not pay the debt in full, and because
§ 1325(f) prevents them from receiving a Chapter 13 discharge,
§ 1325(a)(5)(B)(i) should prevent them from stripping off their valueless junior
mortgages. 142

13 1. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991)).
134. Id. The creditor is protected, moreover, if plan payments are not made or the case is
dismissed. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 349(b)(1)(C) (2012) (providing the actions that take place upon
dismissal).
135. Id. at 339.
136. Id. (Keenan, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 340.
139. Id. (citing DaimlerChrysler Fin. Servs. Ams. LLC v. Ballard (In re Ballard), 526 F.3d
634, 640-41 (10th Cir. 2008)).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol65/iss4/16

14

Todd: To Lien Strip or Not to Lien Strip: Fourth Circuit Blesses Contro
2014]

To LIEN STRIP OR NOT TO LIEN STRIP

977

Judge Keenan also relied upon the legislative history surrounding the
BAPCPA amendments to support her position.143 Section 306 of BAPCPA,
which added subsection (i)(J) to § 1325a)(5)(B), was titled "Giving Secured
Creditors Fair Treatment in Chapter 13."
Moreover, she highlighted a House
Report noting that these additions were "to require-as a condition of
confirmation that a [C]hapter 13 plan provide that a secured creditor retain its
statutory lien until the earlier of when the underlying debt is paid or the debtor
receives a discharge."1 45
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INRE DAVIS DECISION
Undoubtedly, In re Davis is a very important decision for debtors in the
Fourth Circuit. The ability to strip off valueless liens can mean the difference
between foreclosure and keeping the property after a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. For
debtors with multiple liens against their property, in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the
trustee will likely abandon the property assuming the property has no equity in
it-and leave the secured parties and the debtor to their bargained-for state law
remedy of foreclosure. 146 Even after any discharge granted in the initial Chapter
7 proceedin , all the liens will "ride through" the bankruptcy, as lien stripping is
prohibited.
Therefore, after the property has been abandoned, the debtor will
need to either reaffirm the debt or remain current on the debt to stave off
foreclosure.14 8 Importantly, the debtor will need to remain current on all of the
debts on the property, even ones secured by junior liens; this prevents junior
lienholders from foreclosing. 149 Effectively, then, by filing later under Chapter
13 and avoiding the junior liens, the debtor will be able to reduce cash outlaysthe payments to the junior lienholders-and, at the same time, keep the
property.150
Not only is In re Davis significant for debtors practically, but it also
magnifies the split on this issue. Bankruptcy and district court decisions have

143. See id. at 341 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 71 72 (2005), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 103) (citing Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 306, 119 Stat. 23, 80 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2012))).
144. Id. (citing Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-8, § 306, 119 Stat. 23, 80 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)).
145. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 109-31, at 71-72 (2005), reprintedin 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88,
103).
146. This is because keeping the property in the estate would generate no value or benefit for
the unsecured creditors, as any lien holder would need to be paid first in full if possible. See 11
U.S.C. § 554.
147. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992).
148. See Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 908 F.2d 588, 590 (10th Cir. 1990) (explaining
that property abandoned under § 554 ceases to be property of the estate and reverts back to the
debtor as ifno bankruptcy petition was ever filed), aff'd, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
149. See Moody v. FNB S. (In re Moody), 277 B.R. 858, 861 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2001) (citing
In re R-B-Co., Inc., 59 BR. 43, 45 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1986)).
150. See supra Part IID.
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come down on both sides of this issue,
and bankruptcy appellate panels are
also divided.152 Moreover, at least one unpublished court of appeals decision is
contrary to In re Davis.153 Cases are also pending or awaiting decisions at other
courts of appeals. 154
The issue of lien stripping in Chapter 20 bankruptcy may also give the
Supreme Court an opportunity to revisit its schizophrenic statutory construction
in Dewsnup.
Because of Dewsnup, two definitions of allowed secured claim
effectively exist in § 506, depending solely on whether the debtor is in Chapter 7
or Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 156 This result has led to constant critiques of
Dewsnup.15 Some circuit courts of appeals have been more explicit with their
assault on Dewsnup,1 5 and with the Court's composition changing significantly
since Dewsnup, now could be time for its reversal.1 59

151. The following cases are in favor of Chapter 20 lien stripping: Fisette v. Keller (In re
Fisette), 455 B.R. 177, 186-87 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011); In re Dang, 467 B.R. 227, 238 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 2012); In re Okosisi, 451 B.R. 90, 103 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2011); In re Tran, 431 B.R. 230, 237
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2010). The following cases have rejected Chapter 20 lien stripping: In re
Victorio, 454 B.R. 759, 781 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011); In re Gerardin, 447 B.R. 342, 349 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 2011); In re Fenn, 428 B.R. 494, 504 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010); In re Jarvis, 390 B.R. 600,
605-06 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008).
152. Compare In re Fisette, 455 B.R. at 186-87 (holding that a Chapter 13 debtor may strip
off a wholly unsecured lien when he completes his obligations under the plan and this is not
contingent upon discharge), with Bank of the Prairie v. Picht (In re Picht), 428 B.R. 885, 893
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2010) (holding that the unsecured lien could not be stripped until the debt was
either paid or extinguished under other law).
153. See Colbourne v. Ocwen (In re Colbourne), No. 12-14722, 2013 WL 5789159, at *2
(11th Cir. Oct. 29, 2013).
154. See, e.g., Litton Loan v. Blendheim, No. 13-35354 (9th Cir.); Wells Fargo v. Scantling,
No. 13-10558 (11th Cir.).
155. Commentators are already speculating that this issue could be the straw that breaks
Dewsnup's back. See, e.g., Benjamin A. Ellison, Is it Possible that Dewsnup v. Timm Might
Finally be Overturned?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., June 2013, at 60, 92.
156. See Woolsey v. Citibank, N.A. (In re Woolsey), 696 F.3d 1266, 1276 (10th Cir. 2012).
157. See supra note 40; see also Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 420 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Court replaces what Congress said with what it thinks Congress ought to have
said and in the process disregards, and hence impairs for future use, well-established principles of
statutory construction.").
158. See, e.g., In re Woolsey, 696 F.3d at 1273 ("It's surely a topsy-turvy result to give these
two related provisions in the same statutory section entirely different (even opposing) meanings.").
159. As noted by one commentator:
Of the six majority members on the Court who rejected applying 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)
to § 506(d) in 1992, only Justice Anthony Kennedy remains on the bench. The five other
majority justices have all left the bench. By contrast, one of the two members of the
dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia, remains on the Court. Justice Clarence Thomas did not
participate in the original decision despite being on the Court at the time. However, one
might predict that he would vote to reverse Dewsnup having criticized the decision in his
concurring opinion in 203 North LaSalle Street P'ship.
Ellison, supra note 155, at 92.
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On the other hand, despite the maligned statutory construction in Dewsnup,
its underpinnings and policy are clear. As deftly stated by the Sixth Circuit,
Dewsnup stands for the following proposition:
(1) [A]ny increase in the value of the property from the date of the
judicially determined valuation to the time of the foreclosure sale should
accrue to the creditor; (2) the mortgagor and mortgagee bargained that a
consensual lien would remain with the property until foreclosure; and
(3) liens on real property survive bankruptcy unaffected.160
Using these three legs, commentators have argued lien stripping should be
equally disallowed in Chapter 13 and, by extension, Chapter 20.
From a
policy perspective, it is easy to see why this line of argument is appealing. For
example, going back to the original hypothetical of a lien with balance of $125,
but collateral worth only $100, assume a junior lien is also securing a debt of
$15. Under In re Davis, the junior lien can be stripped.162 What if, though, after
the judicial valuation, the property increases in value to $130? The debtor could
possibly reap that $5 in equity; on the other hand, despite doing everything under
state law to have recourse against that property, the junior lien holder cannot
reap the benefit of the increased value due to its loss of the lien. This was the
overarching problem that the Dewsnup majority was painfully trying to avoid.163
But, the same problem remains nevertheless: the "Dewsnupian" legs do not fit
nicely with the statute's plain language.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Fourth Circuit fired the first shot in a long battle that is
taking bankruptcy courts by storm. Eventually, this issue will need to be settled
by the Supreme Court. Both camps have persuasive arguments: the statutory
language seems clearly in favor of Chapter 20 lien stripping, but, on the other
hand, Dewsnup's policy should seemingly apply equally to prevent an end run
around the Chapter 7 lien stripping prohibition. Regardless of the high court's
decision whenever it comes-debtors and lawyers in the Fourth Circuit can,
and should, use In re Davis while they can. When the prospect of Chapter 20
lien stripping is finally settled, either Dewsnup will continue to be the law of the
land or Chapter 20 lien stripping will make it an empty letter in many cases.

160. Talbert v. City Mortg. Servs. (In re Talbert), 344 F.3d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417-18).
161. See David N. Saponara, Note, Lien-Stripping in Consumer Bankruptcy: Debtors Cannot
Strip Liens down Partially,but Can They Strip Them off Entirely? The Answer Should Be No, 21
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 257, 277 (2013).

162. See In re Davis, 716 F.3d 331, 336, 338 (4th Cir. 2013).
163. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417-18.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2014

17

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 16

*

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol65/iss4/16

18

Todd: To Lien Strip or Not to Lien Strip: Fourth Circuit Blesses Contro

*

Published by Scholar Commons, 2014

19

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 16

*

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol65/iss4/16

20

Todd: To Lien Strip or Not to Lien Strip: Fourth Circuit Blesses Contro

ORDER THROUGH HEIN!
Get your missing back volumes and issues
through Hein!

We have obtained the entire back stock, electronic,
reprint and microform rights to ...

South Carolina
Law Review

Complete sets to date are available now!
We can also furnish single volumes and issues!

BACK ISSUES ALSO AVAILABLE
IN HEIN-ON-LINE!
http://heinonline.org

Fred B. Rotman & Co.
AcmeNebrich Bookbindery
Fred 0. Deni & Co.
Metro Self-Storage

Primus Inter Pares

WILLIAM S. HEIN & CO., INC.
Law Publisher/Serial & SubscriptionAgent / Micropublisher
New & Used Law Books / PreservationPrinter/ Bookbinder
1285 Main Street, Buffalo, New York 14209
(716) 882-2600 * TOLL FREE (800) 828-7571 * Fax (716) 883-8100
E- Mail mail@wshein.com * Web Site www.wshein.com

Published by Scholar Commons, 2014

21

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 16

*

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol65/iss4/16

22

Todd: To Lien Strip or Not to Lien Strip: Fourth Circuit Blesses Contro

*

Published by Scholar Commons, 2014

23

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 16

*

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol65/iss4/16

24

